Two weeks ago, in Part I of this research, I argued that the most consequential question in payments law this summer was a definitional one — the difference between a reward and interest — and that it would be answered on one of two tracks. Either the Senate would move the CLARITY Act before the August recess, making its "economically or functionally equivalent" language the operative federal definition of a stablecoin reward, or the window would close and the OCC's rulemaking would proceed as the live venue, its rebuttable presumption carrying the weight the statute declined to.

The fork is now bending, and it's bending toward the regulators.

Senate Majority Leader Thune has all but conceded the bill won't clear the floor before the break. Note carefully why — because it isn't the reward/interest definition, and the distinction matters for how this resolves. On the substance of market structure, the Senate has largely converged; Senator Lummis has merged the Banking and Agriculture drafts into a single package. What's stalling the vote is a separate fight entirely, over a government-ethics provision tied to the President's crypto holdings, one that Democrats won't accept as drafted and some Republicans dislike too. In other words, the legislation is being held up by a question that has nothing to do with stablecoin loyalty — which means the definitional line I traced in Part I is unlikely to be drawn by statute this year, not because Congress rejected it, but because Congress ran out of runway on an unrelated dispute.

That throws the weight onto the second track, exactly as Part I anticipated.

With the legislative path blocked, the OCC's February proposal becomes the venue where the reward/interest line actually gets drawn. Its architecture is the one to watch now: a rebuttable presumption that where an issuer and an affiliate coordinate arrangements resulting in yield paid to holders, the arrangement is prohibited unless the parties prove otherwise. It inverts the burden of proof, and it reaches past the issuer to the distribution tier where the balance-linked rewards programs actually live. What the statute would have settled in a clause, the supervisor will now settle through interpretation — a slower path, and a less legible one, to the same destination.

And the destination does not change. This is the part worth holding onto through the procedural noise. Whether the line is drawn by Senate text or by OCC presumption, it falls in the same place, because it was never really Washington's line to invent — the payments industry drew it four decades ago, at the birth of modern loyalty: value that attaches to a transaction earns its keep; value that attaches to a balance is deposit economics wearing another name. The venue shifting from Congress to the Comptroller changes the timeline and the mechanism. It does not change the economics, and it does not change the design brief. Balance-linked rewards are still living on borrowed time — now by rule rather than by statute.

So the practical guidance from Part I stands, and if anything hardens. The programs built on "hold the coin, collect a rate" should be read as transitional regardless of what the Senate does in the fall. The safe ground remains the activity-based lane — rewards that price a payment event rather than a holding — and the institutions best positioned to build there are still the ones that have run transaction-funded loyalty for forty years, not the ones that architected around reserve-income share.

Part II — the full treatment — publishes once the venue settles: a section-level reading of whichever instrument ends up operative, the industry's counter-case in full, and the economics of the surviving design space. The fork bending toward the OCC is not that resolution. It is the sign of which way to read for it.

The venue moved from Congress to the Comptroller. The line didn't move at all.